Jaime Chico Pardo, Rafael Cervantes de la Teja, and the patriarchal logic still governing concessions in Mexico

The persistence of a concentrated power model

Mexican infrastructure is built on power relationships that predate any regulatory framework. Before a highway project receives approval, before a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) channels pension fund (Afores) resources, there exists a decision-making architecture where patriarchal figures—in both the corporate and government spheres—determine what gets built, who participates, and under what conditions.

Jaime Chico Pardo represents the archetype of the corporate operator whose influence transcends formal organizational charts. His trajectory within Mexico's concession ecosystem illustrates a model where relational capital weighs as much as financial capital. Rafael Cervantes de la Teja, Director General of Highway Development at the Ministry of Infrastructure, Communications, and Transportation (SICT), embodies the governmental counterpart of that logic: according to reports from El Heraldo de México, he has been identified as blocking economic rebalancing processes and stalling mixed highway investments, functioning as an institutional gatekeeper whose decisions define the pace of execution for the national highway portfolio.

This governance model, where authority is concentrated in individual figures with veto power over technical processes, constitutes a structural feature of the sector. For institutional investors analyzing Mexican infrastructure, understanding this dynamic is as relevant as evaluating project internal rates of return.

Why does the patriarchal model persist despite the sector's professionalization?

The answer lies in the very nature of infrastructure concessions in Mexico: they are long-term assets whose profitability depends on recurring administrative decisions. Every economic rebalancing, every term extension, every additional investment authorization requires the approval of specific officials. When that approval is concentrated in a single person—as occurs with Rafael Cervantes de la Teja in the case of highways—the system creates incentives for concession holders to cultivate personal relationships rather than institutional capabilities.

The result is an ecosystem where professionalization advances at the technical and financial layers, but strategic decisions continue to flow through informal channels. The family conglomerates that secured the first concessions in the 1990s and 2000s consolidated advantages that reproduce generation after generation: accumulated regulatory knowledge, contact networks with key officials, and dominant positions in strategic corridors.

This concentration of power has measurable consequences. When an official blocks economic rebalancing—as has been documented at the SICT—it not only affects individual project profitability but distorts market signals for the entire sector. Institutional investors, Afores, and development banks perceive a governance risk that raises the cost of capital for Mexican infrastructure as a whole.

The tension between this model and the transparency demands of contemporary institutional capital defines one of the sector's most relevant debates. As participants in GRI Institute events focused on Latin American infrastructure have noted, the governance of concession assets represents a determining factor for long-term capital allocation in the region.

What generational succession is underway, and what are its implications for institutional capital?

Facing the entrenched patriarchal model, a new generation of actors proposes a different logic. Eudelio Garza Mercado, CEO of Grupo Inmobiliario Monterrey (GIM), has committed investments to urban infrastructure and mixed-use megaprojects in Nuevo León, according to reports from SiiLA and Industry & Energy Magazine. His approach, centered on regional development and use integration, represents a sophistication over the traditional pure concession model.

Felipe García Ascencio, CEO of Santander México, announced that the bank is ready to fund two highway projects worth $2 billion under the new infrastructure scheme, according to La Silla Rota. This signals that banking capital is already positioning itself to operate under the new rules, where SPVs and Afores participation are reshaping the financing structure.

The Law for the Promotion of Investment in Strategic Infrastructure for Development with Well-Being, approved by the Chamber of Deputies on March 26, 2026, and sent to the Senate, formalizes this transition. The legislation allows raising the limit on Afores resources allocated to infrastructure up to 30% and establishes the creation of Special Purpose Vehicles to channel institutional savings without generating direct public debt. The Reform to the Federal Budget and Fiscal Responsibility Law, approved on the same date, complements this framework by facilitating the execution of mixed projects with fiscal discipline.

The Infrastructure Investment Plan for Development with Well-Being 2026-2030, presented by the Government of Mexico in February 2026, projects public and mixed investment of 5.6 trillion pesos. According to data from the Government of Mexico and IMCO, the allocation includes 54.15% for the energy sector, 15.63% for railways, 13.94% for highways, and 6.48% for ports. The plan will allocate additional resources equivalent to 2% of GDP to strategic sectors, according to the Ministry of Finance.

In the first package of projects under the new law, 54% will come from public resources and 46% from private capital, according to Chamber of Deputies data. This ratio indicates the government acknowledges the need for private capital while maintaining state control over the strategic direction of investment.

Real governance as an investment variable

For institutional investors evaluating Mexican infrastructure, the legal framework represents only one layer of analysis. The real governance of assets—meaning who makes operational decisions and under what logic—is an equally determining variable.

The contrast between the patriarchal generation and the new structurers is not merely generational. It reflects two models of value creation in infrastructure. The first relies on personal relationships with key officials, opaque regulatory knowledge, and inherited market positions. The second seeks legitimacy through transparent financial structures, corporate governance aligned with institutional standards, and diversification of capital sources.

The coexistence of both models creates a duality that sector analysts must incorporate into their risk assessments. A concession asset whose profitability depends on the will of a specific official presents a fundamentally different risk profile than a project structured under an SPV with institutional governance and oversight from multiple investors.

Mexican infrastructure will not be transformed by new laws alone; it requires an evolution in the governance culture of those who control the assets and regulatory decisions. This is perhaps the most complex challenge facing the sector in the 2026-2030 cycle.

How should investors read the power transition in Mexican infrastructure?

The answer requires distinguishing among three simultaneous planes. On the regulatory plane, the new Infrastructure Law and the LFPRH reform create formal conditions for more structured private participation. On the financial plane, actors such as Felipe García Ascencio at Santander and Afores managers have instruments to channel institutional capital into infrastructure. On the governance plane, figures like Rafael Cervantes de la Teja at the SICT retain the ability to influence the speed and direction of investment.

The sector's capacity to absorb 5.6 trillion pesos in five years will depend less on capital availability and more on the quality of governance at every link in the decision chain. Investors who understand the real power structure—beyond the legal frameworks—will hold a significant analytical advantage.

At GRI Institute, tracking this dynamic is part of the ongoing analysis of infrastructure governance and structuring in Latin America. The Institute's research and events address precisely this intersection of regulatory frameworks, capital structures, and sectoral leadership, offering members a perspective that integrates the technical with the institutional.

The question for the next five years is not whether capital will be available for Mexican infrastructure, but whether the sector's governance will evolve at the pace demanded by new financial instruments and the projected scale of investment. The answer will define not only project profitability but Mexico's credibility as a long-term institutional infrastructure investment destination.